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Executive Summary
The Syrian conflict has altered the ecosystem in northern Syria in many ways. However, 
the most significant shift has been Aleppo’s disconnection from the surrounding countryside, its 
suburbs having practically become economically autonomous from the city. The de facto safe zones 
established in the Euphrates Shield area and in the Afrin region following successive Turkish military 
interventions have, in theory, given northern Aleppo with a greater potential for economic recovery.
Several local actors interact within the northern Aleppo ecosystem, most notably local councils, the 
Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). Opposition armed factions 
are influential in the local economy and carry out various illicit activities focusing on smuggling 
and real-estate. Local councils, which answer directly to the closest Turkish provincial governors, 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the SIG. They regulate trade, issue directives, collect taxes 
and conduct contracts with the Turkish private sector. Armed opposition groups and local councils 
regularly challenge the SIG’s authority, which suffers from scarce financial resources and enjoys little 
clout over the distribution of public funds.
Northern Aleppo’s main strategic asset is its four operational border crossings with Turkey. The area’s 
access to Turkey allows for the procurement of different types of merchandise and raw-material for 
production. Turkey feeds the region with electricity through two privately-owned companies, but 
little investment has been made in building up local electricity generation capacity. The cities of Azaz, 
Afrin, and Jarablus have not suffered from water shortages and depend on surface water for domestic 
and agricultural uses. Al-Bab and its surrounding are dependent on groundwater, and not enough 
water is extracted for agricultural activities. Northern Aleppo procures its fuel from the Autonomous 
Administration of North and East Syria and from the international market through Turkey. A few 
warlords control the sector, and the prices of fuel, gasoline and butane gas are considerably higher 
than in north-eastern Syria and than in regime-controlled areas.
The agricultural sector has produced more in the last three seasons thanks to higher rainfall levels. 
Farmers, however, are still struggling to make a profit. Moreover, armed actors harass olive oil 
producers. Manufacturing has not witnessed a significant boost despite efforts to encourage capital 
investment in the sector. Industrialists are facing legal challenges to export and market their products 
locally. They also lack any kind of financial or institutional backing. The region’s main economic 




The city of Aleppo was traditionally considered the focal point of northern Syria’s economy. 
This was a result of its historical role in regional trade; the concentration of centuries-old wealth; 
and its large population of craftsmen and industrialists. Consequently, the vast majority of northern 
Syria’s raw material production – agriculture, minerals, quarries and others – was fed into Aleppo’s 
industrial system. During Bashar al-Assad’s rule, the city’s central role in the regional and national 
economy was further reinforced by a mutually beneficial relationship between the Aleppine business 
class and Syrian regime figures. This consolidation of wealth and activities in this city was coupled 
with the lack of public and private investments in its rural areas. The countryside remained in a 
relatively undeveloped state except for minor projects to provide it with basic needs in education, 
power, water and agricultural production. Hence, most of those from Aleppo’s hinterland went to the 
‘city,’ either for work opportunities and education or to establish workshops or trade within the city’s 
advanced infrastructure.
In July 2012, Syrian armed opposition groups took control over all Aleppo’s eastern neighbourhoods 
and its countryside. In addition to a significant population exodus, capital flight, and the destruction 
of industrial complexes, Aleppo was completely cut off from its labour pools and raw materials. 
The conflict has directly affected and changed the complex set of socio-economic relations that elevated 
Aleppo as the north’s financial and industrial epicentre and has also theoretically put northern Syria’s 
rural areas on track for economic autonomy.1 However, Aleppo governorate witnessed fierce clashes 
between Islamic State (IS), the People’s Protection Forces (YPG), regime forces and Syrian armed 
opposition groups. Backed by their respective international and regional allies, opponents battled 
over control of the Syrian side of the Turkish border, access to the strategic dams on the Euphrates and 
logistic routes that marked land corridors between enclaves. Through these struggles, local political 
geography has been regularly reshaped, preventing local communities from engaging in production 
activities or from developing a robust, stable administrative structure for governing the economy.
Since 2016, the Turkish army has launched four military campaigns in Syria, two in Aleppo 
governorate: Operation Euphrates Shield (August 2016 - March 2017), which ended the presence of 
IS in the cities of Jarablus, Azaz and al-Bab; and Operation Olive Branch (January - March 2018), 
which drove the YPG out of Afrin. These two interventions established a Turkish-controlled area over 
4,114 square kilometres, bordering the Euphrates from Jarablus to Maghayer in the east, and by the 
YPG and the regime forces from Manbij to Nubl in the south (Map 1). 
In this area, referred to here as ‘northern Aleppo’, the Turkish army has established a de facto no-fly 
zone, eliminating the threat of regime ground assaults and the indiscriminate shelling of civilians. 
There are from estimated 1.1 to 1.5 million civilians, including around 400,000 Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs). The area does not host a former provincial capital, and its most prominent cities and 
towns are Azaz, Afrin, al-Bab, al-Rai, Jarablus, Jindires and Marea. The unemployment rate stood 
at 57.7% in the last quarter of 2014, up from 14.9% before the war. Based on household income and 
expenditure surveys, the poverty rate was close to 80% in the summer of 2020. 
Northern Aleppo has a relatively secure environment, access to the outer world, a stable 
well-delineated territory and shared borders with the Autonomous Administration of North 
and East Syria (AANES) and regime-held areas. Local authorities there can virtually 
exploit and manage undisputed resources to relaunch the economy of a war-torn region. 
1  Khedder Khaddour, “Consumed by War, The End of Aleppo and Northern Syria’s Political Order,” Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, October 2017, https://bit.ly/2IMcQAJ
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Moreover, the political support these authorities receive from Turkey may provide them with 
financial and logistic assistance to transform the local administration into a sustainable and flexible 
governance structure. Examining the nature and form of economic development in this area offers an 
understanding of Turkey’s projection into the border regions and flags up obstacles to reconstruction.
This paper attempts to evaluate the efforts produced to rehabilitate of northern Aleppo from 2016 and 
the Turkish military interventions. It identifies the main actors present in the area and the available 
vital resources for implementing a reconstruction strategy. The paper, then, moves on to the economic 
activities and the challenges Syrian businessmen are currently facing. The study mainly relies on 
public reports and fifteen interviews conducted with members of local councils, heads of Chambers 
of Commerce and Industries, businessmen and local activists in January 2021.2 
2  The researcher faced significant difficulties in obtaining reliable data and cross-checking said data. Additionally, since 
the region is not covered by a single administrative unit, there is no one to collect and assess data. There are, then, 
important gaps in the data and a lack of precise numbers.
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1. Local Governance in Northern Aleppo: Actors and Structures
By virtue of its military presence, Turkey is the supreme authority. However, Ankara’s 
interaction with the public is limited and passes through local actors. Locally, northern Aleppo’s 
governance structures remain disorganised and are radically decentralised. Crippled by factionalism 
and a lack of Turkish interest to empower a central authority, local actors are constantly engaged in 
competition and conflicts over interests. There are two types of local actors. First, armed factions 
actively seek different revenue sources to sustain their presence and to pay dividends to their member 
and affiliates. Second, the opposition civilian administration is, in theory, under the Syrian Interim 
Government (SIG) umbrella. But this opposition-affiliated government remains the weakest actor on 
the ground despite its official mandate from the Syrian National Coalition. The Turkish army relies on 
the Syrian National Army (SNA) to maintain the region’s security and to address any threat from the 
Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), while the Turkish Interior Ministry relies on local councils 
to govern the area. 
1.1.     Armed Groups: Between Investment and Predation
Since its establishment in 2014, the Levant Front has been the dominant faction in opposition-
held territories in northern Aleppo, but its influence has been gradually diluted. Turkey’s need for 
more Syrian militants to engage in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch military operations paved 
the way for the rise of local factions, such as the al-Mutasim Brigade and the Hamza Division, and 
brought new actors from other regions, most notably Idlib and Deir ez-Zor, such as the Sulaiman 
Shah and Ahrar al-Sharqiya brigades.3 Evacuated armed groups from Homs and Eastern Ghouta also 
established a presence in the area. 
Despite the nominal unification of these armed opposition groups under the SNA, many factions 
remain autonomous in the region. All the SNA factions receive salaries for their members from 
Turkey.4 They also receive dividends from customs imposed on trade passing through the official 
Syria-Turkey border crossings. Nevertheless, these financial resources  cannot sustain their current 
expenses, local authority, or autonomy vis-à-vis the SIG or local councils. 
Indeed, most SNA factions have an ‘economic bureau’ in charge of managing their finances. These 
run affiliated businesses, impose transit fees, expand real estate ownership, smuggle goods in and out 
of the region, and broker deals between local producers and Turkish traders and companies.5 Armed 
groups’ economic networks are essentially composed of informal partnerships with numerous traders, 
intermediaries and smugglers. The armed opposition groups have demonstrated a special interest 
in two economic sectors which allow quick gains with relatively little investment in equipment or 
equity: real estate and trade/smuggling. 
3  Khayrallah al-Hilu, “The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies,” Research Project 
Report, (Florence: European University Institute, Middle East Directions, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria, 14 January 
2021), https://bit.ly/3skp0nO 
4  Twenty-one of the 36 SNA factions had previously received support from the US in training, salaries, or equipment. 
Murat Yeşiltaş, Merve Seren, and Necdet Özçelik, “Operation Euphrates Shield: Implementation and Lessons Learned,” 
Report (Istanbul: SETA, 2017), https://bit.ly/396gotl 
5  Interview with a member of Afrin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Afrin, January 2021.
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The interest in real estate has translated into various activities, including: the purchase of prime private 
properties in cities and agricultural lands; the appropriation of public assets; and the construction of 
commercial and residential buildings and complexes.6 These activities have been extended to control 
over the construction materials market. For instance, the Levant Front has acquired cement mills, sand 
quarries and retail shops selling imported building materials.7 Moreover, many local and international 
human rights organisations have denounced the SNA for seizure of private property and generalised 
extortion. Reports suggest that commercial shops were taken despite their owners still being in place. 
This was done either for commanders on the ground to exploit directly or for the SNA to rent these 
units to IDPs from eastern and western Ghouta.8 
Moreover, various armed factions are involved in the control of border crossings with Turkey 
(see below). Factions with a territory adjacent to AANES or regime-held areas also directly operate 
and protect internal crossings for trade and impose fees on shipments passing through them.9 
The temporary closures of internal crossings add to the importance of smuggling, which particularly 
benefits the armed groups engaged in it. The significant income generated from illegal crossing points 
has previously sparked armed confrontations between the SNA for their control.10 
Armed factions’ economic networks compete with local traders and intermediaries and this 
discourages independent investments. Merchants find themselves obliged to work with influential 
SNA commanders to gain protection in a market governed by ‘economic mafias’. Publicly, armed 
non-state actors are perceived as predators. In Arab or Turkmen majority cities such as Azaz, Marea, 
al-Rai and Jarablus, factions have displayed more sensitivity in attempts to maintain a positive public 
image and to respond to local grievances. In Afrin and other Kurdish majority towns and villages such 
as Jindires, Raju and Shaykh al-Hadid, they have shown much less constraint. Taking advantage of 
Turkish security imperatives, SNA factions often exploit false accusations of collaboration with the 
PYD to force the local population into submission.11  
To absorb local discontentment and international pressure, in 2018 Turkey prompted the SNA central 
command to establish a military police force for security provision to replace SNA factions.12 In early 
2020, the presence of SNA factions was less evident in the cities. But they have continued with their 
economic ventures and their violations of private and public properties. To install a sense of self-
accountablity, the Syrian Islamic Council, the chief Syrian opposition Sunni religious authority based 
in Istanbul, established in September 2020 the Syrian National Reform and Grievances Settlement 
Committee. This committee was meant to process civilian complaints and to curb the violations of 
6  Mohamed Homs, “Afrin Real Estate, a Thorny Issue Between the Owners and the Displaced” (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, 
7 October 2018, http://bit.ly/2QsuGxL; Rudaw, “Who is Called ‘Abu Amsha’, Whose Name is Associated With the Most 
Extensive Crimes and Violations in Afrin?” (in Arabic),  20 November 2019, https://bit.ly/2PkGSju  
7  Interview with a local activist, Jindires, January 2021. 
8  Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Turkey-Backed Groups Seizing Property in Afrin” (in Arabic), 14 June 2018, 
http://bit.ly/2HWu3Wo; Ninar Khalifeh, “Seizure, Usufruct and Royalties, Who Protect Property Rights in Afrin” (in 
Arabic), Enab Baladi, 22 July 2020, http://bit.ly/3cY8h34; Syrian for Truth and Justice, “Afrin: Shaykh Al Hadid: 
Intimidation and Economic Tightening,” 9 March 2020, https://bit.ly/3rjXt4A 
9  Fees reached USD 2000 on trucks of 20 tonnes going to regime-held areas. Interview with a local business owner, Azaz, 
January 2021.
10  Cumhuriyet, “Clashes Broke Out Between Turkish-Backed FSA Soldiers: 2 Dead, 17 Injured” (in Turkish), 14 October 
2016, http://bit.ly/3rSBBOE; Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey Making Itself at Home in Syria,” al-Monitor, 29 May 2019, 
http://bit.ly/3raPIh3 
11  Interview with a local imam, member of the Common Settlement Committee, Afrin, January 2021.
12  Khalid al-Khatib, “The Opposition Announces the Formation of the Military Police in the Euphrates Shield Area” 
(in Arabic), al-Monitor, 22 March 2018,  http://bit.ly/3bJ1V8d 
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SNA factions.13 In practice, this initiative had little success, mainly because the council enjoys no real 
authority and it is perceived as an external actor by SNA factions.14 As an alternative, SNA-affiliated 
imams and sheikhs created a new initiative called the Common Settlement Committee in Afrin in 
October 2020 with the hope of greater involvement from the brigades in settling disputes.15 The latter 
initiative has seen more success by capitalizing on factions’ vindictiveness towards each other. But 
it still lacks the mechanism for reinforcement to deter influential warlords and brigade commanders. 
1.2.       Civilian Administration: A Disguised Autonomy 
Local councils, established after Turkish military interventions are supposed to cooperate 
with the SIG’s Ministry of Local Administration. However, they enjoy a great deal of autonomy and 
rarely seek the Ministry’s approval. Councillors, appointed or backed by Turkish officials, are much 
more likely to accommodate Turkey’s authorities than the SIG.16 Ankara has imposed its influence 
on Syrian local councils by tying each region to the Turkish province adjacent to it and replicating 
Turkish administrative divisions. There are local councils in large cities with smaller subordinate 
councils in surrounding towns and villages, much as with Turkish municipalities.17
Local councils interact in different ways with the ecosystem, either by issuing executive orders, by 
imposing taxes, by managing remaining public properties, or by concluding contracts with private 
companies for service provisions. Each council has an economic and finances office and dedicated 
teams for regulating trade, industry and agriculture. The councils also report to an advisor from the 
relevant Turkish ministry.18 The involvement of each Turkish advisor varies a lot depending on his 
own willingness to engage in the council’s activities.  
In addition to the local councils, new independent local Chambers of Commerce and Industry  were 
established in Azaz (October 2017), al-Bab and Jarablus (2018) and Afrin (March 2019).19 About 
4,000 Syrian businessmen are affiliated with these four Chambers.20 The Azaz Chamber counts 
the city’s most influential businessmen among its ranks. Whereas, Afrin Chamber members were 
appointed by Hatay governor and those of al-Bab and Jarablus were elected by a general assembly 
of local businessmen. The Chambers’ objectives are to improve cooperation in the private sector, to 
negotiate better common agreements with Turkish companies and to act as a bridge with the local 
administration. They are nominally independent organisations, but there is no strong demarcation 
between the Chambers and local councils. Many of the members of Chambers are members or work 
for local councils, blurring the line between the two bodies. 
13  Firas al-Khatib, “The Formation of Two Committees for ‘Redressing Grievances’ and ‘Reform’ in Northern Syria” 
(in Arabic), Syria TV, 23 October 2020, http://bit.ly/3s0C5T7 
14  Interview with a local imam, member of the Common Settlement Committee, Afrin, January 2021
15  Hussein Omar, “Human Rights in Afrin: The Committee for ‘Redressing Grievances’ Will not Return to the Kurds their 
Homes Seized from Armed Groups” (In Arabic), Rudaw TV, 5 November 2020, https://bit.ly/3tL4AnX 
16  Despite the nomination of the head of Afrin Local Council, Said Sulaiman, by the MLA minister in September 2019 
to encourage  cooperation,  local councils continue to act autonomously of the SIG, thus significantly hampering all 
collective efforts to streamline economic governance.
17  Kilis oversees Azaz and Marea, Gaziantep oversees Jarablus, al-Bab and al-Rai, Hatay oversees Afrin and Jindires. 
Al-Hilu, ‘The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria’.
18  Turkish Ministries of Health, Education, Economy, Trade, Industry, and Youth, all have dedicated delegates in each 
major local council.
19  The heads of Chambers of Commerce and Industries are Ibrahim Drbalh (Azaz), Khallawi Ramdan (Jarablus), 
Abdulnasser Hisso (Afrin) and Ahmad Hamza (al-Bab). 
20  Interviews with members of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, January 2021.
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Northern Aleppo’s governance structures follow, to no small degree, the Turkish governance model, 
in which municipalities enjoy financial autonomy over their designated jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
Syrian local councils do not have the degree of centralisation necessary to orchestrate and coordinate 
the public sector. This ungoverned decentralisation model has resulted in a lack of accountability and 
transparency. The performance of any given local structure is dependent on their members’ will to act 
and work, and to a much lesser degree, on popular opinion. As a result, the SIG has become an entity 
with no reinforcement power. It has little sway over the different actors, their intertwined spheres of 
activity, and still less is it able to exploit local resources.
1.3.       Managing Crossing Points: Conflict and Competition
The northern Aleppo region’s principal geostrategic asset is its proximity to Turkey, which 
offers it a gateway to the outer world and protection from regime agression. This region shares four 
border crossings with Turkey: Bab al-Salamah, Jarablus, al-Rai and Bab al-Hemam. Linked to the 
M5 highway crossing Syria from north to south and passing through Aleppo and Damascus, Bab 
al-Salamah has been one of Turkey’s most important border crossings, together with Bab al-Hawa 
(Map 1).21 As fees imposed on border crossings and on internal crossings constitute a major revenue 
source for local actors, their management has always been a conflictual issue among armed groups 
and has shown the limited room for maneouvre of the SIG.
Map 1: Northern Aleppo Main Crossings and Roads 
Source: The author, February 2021
21  Smaller in size and relevance, the Jarablus crossing was mainly used for civilians crossing before 2011 and was 
upgraded for commercial purposes only in 2016. Turkey opened two new crossings to facilitate military equipment 
movement to its troops and goods for commercial intent. The al-Rai crossing was inaugurated in late 2017, and al-Hemam 
in April 2018 to link Jindires to Hatay. Sham Network, “Turkey Upgrades the Classification of Jarablus Crossing to 
Become a Commercial Crossing” (in Arabic), 23 October 2016, https://bit.ly/3udoUjc; Enab Baladi, “The al-Rai Crossing 
with Turkey is Officially Opened” (in Arabic), 16 December 2017, http://bit.ly/3sg7Jf8   
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In October 2017, following rising tensions between opposition factions over the lucrative income from 
the Bab al-Salamah crossing, the Turkish government brokered a share revenue agreement between 
the SIG and the SNA.22 This agreement stipulates that the SIG is responsible for the management of all 
crossings and that any income should be equally redistributed between local councils, SNA factions and 
the SIG.23 Accordingly, the SIG established a Custom Directorate to regulate import and export activities. 
The Directorate periodically updates custom and transit fees in Turkish Lira and deposits all revenues 
in the SIG Prime Minister’s Bank Account in the Turkish State Ziraat Katalim Bank.24 
In practice, however, various armed factions control these border crossings, and 40% of revenues go 
to SNA factions, 45% to local councils, 5% for maintenance, and only 10% to the SIG.25  Despite its 
official mandate, SIG’s control and autonomy remain highly questionable. The Turkish governors, in 
adjacent regions, issue directives to the SIG for the specific amount each local council they oversee 
should receive. Similarly, the Turkish Defence Ministry informs the SIG of the SNA allocated budget 
to be covered by border crossing revenues. In practice, the SIG primarily acts as a mere signatory. 
It has no power over other beneficiates, further weakening its authority. 
In addition to borders with Turkey, the SIG also officially operates internal crossing points with 
regime-held territory (such as Abu al-Zandin and Tadef), the AANES (such as Umm Jalloud, 
Halwanji, al-Hamran and Abu Haij and Awn al-Dadat), and Idlib (such as Daret Ezzah and Deir 
Ballout). But its authority here is, too, only nominal and SNA factions control these crossing points. 
Internal crossings with the AANES were closed for four months between October 2019 and January 
2020 in reaction to the Turkish Peace Spring Operation in Tall Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.26 On the other 
hand, all crossings into regime-held territories have been closed since April 2020 in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and security concerns.27 Despite SIG efforts to control the flow of people and 
merchandise from AANES and regime-held areas, all SNA factions on these frontlines operate and 
facilitate smuggling through their zones of influence, damaging efforts to regulate trade exchange and 
transport with their Syrian neighbours. 
22  Enab Baladi, “Interim Government Takes Over the Bab al-Salamah Crossing North of Aleppo” (in Arabic), 10 October 
2017, https://bit.ly/3k1QSZ3 
23  The monthly revenues of all border crossings under the SIG management is estimated to reach from four to six million 
USD per month. The volume of overall Turkish exports through Bab al-Salamah and al-Rai amounted to USD 560 million 
in 2018. Hurriyet, “Gaziantep’s Increases Exports to Syria” (in Turkish), 13 November 2018,  http://bit.ly/3d1njov 
24  Syrian Interim Government Presidency, Ministry of Finance and Economy, “Decree N. 25, List of Custom Fees,” 
3 February 2021, http://bit.ly/31aqfda 
25  Ishtar Al Shami, “Syrian Battlefields Divide Adversaries; Lucrative Border Crossings Bring Them Together,” 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 March 2020, http://bit.ly/2P0yWEf 
26  Syrian Human Rights Observatory, “Three Months After its Closure, the ‘Umm Jalloud’ Crossing Opens its 
Doors to Commercial Traffic between the SDF Regions and the Pro-Turkey Factions” (in Arabic), 28 January 2019, 
http://bit.ly/30ISv6e
27  Among the cited reasons are concern over an illicit narcotics trade. Syrian Interim Government, “Circular by the 
Ministry of Defence in the Interim Government Regarding Tightening Procedures at Crossings and Seam Lines” 
(in Arabic), 7 April 2020, http://bit.ly/3qRog7Q 
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2. Water-Energy Nexus 
During the war years, civilians suffered constant power cuts and frequent water shortages. 
Fighting and indiscriminate bombing, including heavy weaponry such as scud missiles, were 
widespread in the Aleppo governorate and resulted in large-scale displacement and a dramatic decrease 
in production. To relaunch the northern Aleppo economy, Turkey and the local administrations need 
to invest heavily in water and energy provision as conductors for food security and production in 
industry and agriculture. 
2.1.       Electricity: Dependence on Turkey
Before the conflict, electricity services were provided to northern Aleppo by the General 
Company for Electricity of Aleppo Governorate and the district Electricity Department. According 
to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MOAAR), 99.7% of households received 
electricity, fed by a grid connected to the Safira thermal power generation plant.28 However, in 2012, 
the regime suspended all electricity services funding in opposition-controlled areas and this naturally 
affected the electricity distribution network’s maintenance and operation.29 Additionally, the high 
voltage electricity network and the associated grid of transformer stations were significantly affected 
by indiscriminate shelling and looting, resulting in frequent power supply failures. 
In 2016, local power generation fell to 25% of its original capacity. The local population became 
highly dependent on high-cost privately-owned generators for electricity, and subsequently, the cost 
of agricultural and industrial production increased.30 To compensate for the public sector’s sporadic 
electricity supply, private individuals provided new means of electricity production. A market for 
electricity generator subscriptions was established. This solution, though, proved to be temporary 
and benefited only a narrow class of affluent individuals, while most civilians had little or no access 
to power. 
One of the earliest Turkish investments in the region after the end of military operations was to 
regulate electricity provision for domestic and industrial use. Turkey’s interest in rehabilitating the 
electricity grid and provision is motivated by the relatively cheap cost and an immediate return on 
investment. Contrary to other sectors, the electric infrastructure is operational, and paid subscriptions 
could directly cover provision costs. Furthermore, the Turkish private sector has shown a greater 
appetite to invest in the sector, thus saving Ankara from having to micro-manage energy matters. 
Currently, two companies share the energy market in northern Aleppo: AK Enerji – established in 2018 
in Kilis;31 and the Syrian Turkish Electricity Company (STE). Both companies operate exclusively in 
Syria. Most of their investment in rehabilitating the relevant electricity infrastructure is employed on 
maintaining the power grid and linking new settlements, as their public accounts on social media reveal.32 
28  The supply source for the northern district in Aleppo was via 20 kV feeders from 66/20 kV substations. SRTF, 
“Rehabilitation of the Medium and Low Voltage Grid in Urban, Sub-urban and Rural Communities in a Northern District 
in Aleppo,” 28 June 2019, https://bit.ly/2Q2dIGp 
29  Ibid
30  SRTF, “Sustainable Energy Solar System for Water Pumping Stations in Rural Areas of North Aleppo - Phase I,” 12 
December 2020, https://bit.ly/3tku1ge 
31  Tikla, “Ak Energy Electric Construction Trade and Industry Limited Company” (in Turkish), http://bit.ly/3lF2C5Y 
32  STE connects Suran cıty to Afrın Electricity Grid. STE enerij, “The Technical Team Continues Its Work to  Extend the 
Medium Voltage Line from the Station of Afrin to the Station of Suran,” Facebook, 12 March 2021, http://bit.ly/3eBCvLD; 
Ak Energy, “Official Facebook Page,” Facebook, http://bit.ly/31bJfry; STE enerji, “Official Facebook Page,” 
http://bit.ly/3sgadKz  
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The two companies procure their electricity from generators located in the adjacent Turkish territory 
and then transfer it to northern Aleppo.33 Turkish commercial law regulates electricity provision 
contracts between the two Turkish companies and Syrian local authorities.34
Syrian local councils are responsible for attributing the energy grid’s exploitation rights and operate 
independently from each other and from the SIG.35 In theory, the Turkish governor who oversees 
the relevant area initiates the attribution process by issuing a public tender exclusively available 
for Turkish national companies. The governor is supposed to mediate between the local Syrian 
administration and any applicants,36 but in practice he acts as a decision-maker.The local council 
is then invited at the last stage to officialise the agreement with the selected company. Indeed, the 
contract’s final draft is provided in Turkish with no Arabic translation and remains in the governor’s 
office with no copy being offered to the Syrian council.37 
The terms of the final agreement are obscure, and no public records are shared with the Syrian public. 
Representatives from local councils have stated that the contract’s duration is ten years and compels 
the contractor to invest in infrastructure, but the nature and scale of the investment are undetermined 
and unclear. All subscriptions are prepaid, and the contractor collects fees directly from consumers 
through Turkish Postal Company (PTT) branches present in the region. Local councils reserve the 
right to renegotiate the price every year. Kilowatt rates differ from one provider to another, ranging 
from 65 to 85 Turkish cents for domestic use and from 85 cents to 1 TL for industrial and agricultural 
use.38
The most significant efforts in rebuilding the energy sector are currently led by the Syrian Recovery 
Trust Fund (SRTF), in cooperation with the SIG. The SRTF is a multi-donor trust fund set up, in 
September 2013, by the Group of Friends of the Syrian People and its Working Group on Economic 
Recovery and Development.39 Through the SRTF, donors pool their funds to finance priority projects 
for essential services in sectors such as water, electricity and food security, among others. In northern 
Aleppo – except for Afrin where it does not operate due to legal and human rights concerns over the 
Turkish military intervention in the area – the SRTF has procured fuel, solar and wind-powered stand-
alone energy generating unitswith a declared budget of EUR 5.2 million since 2015.40 The Fund has also 
restored electricity distribution grids and lines; transformers and substations; electricity distribution 
grids and bringing their extension to new communities; high and medium tension transmission lines; 
and power lines for public services whenever relevant (e.g., water pumps and hospitals).
At the time of writing, electricity coverage in Azaz, al-Rai and Jarablus is over 90%, but it is on 
70% in al-Bab and 60% in Afrin.41 The lower number in al-Bab is due to the considerable damage 
its infrastructure has endured during the conflict. As to Afrin the low numbers there reflect a lack of 
international assistance and delayed Turkish investments. Nevertheless, the local administration there 
remains hopeful that it will reach a similar coverage level to the rest of the region by the end of 2021. 
33  At the time of writing, there are no indications for the establishment of new power plants in Syria, thus increasing the 
region’s total dependency on Turkey for energy supply.
34  Interview with a member of Afrin Chamber of Commerce, Afrin, January 2021. 
35  Interview with an employee of trade office in Azaz local council, Azaz, January 2021.
36  Ibid.
37  Interview with a member of Afrin Chamber of Commerce, Afrin, January 2021.
38  Local councillors revealed that councils are given a fraction of the subscription, but they failed to give the exact 
amount. They, however, stated it was minor and barely cover the price of their own electricity bills. Interviews with 
members of local councils, January 2021.
39  SRTF, “Overview”, 21 October 2014, http://bit.ly/3f708Md  
40  SRTF, “Approved Projects in the Electricity Sector”, http://bit.ly/31ddBtM  
41  Interviews with businessmen from the cities of Azaz, Jarablus, Afrin and al-Bab, January 2021.
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2.2.       Water: Provision Variations
Like electricity, water is a vital necessity for reconstruction and agricultural production. 
Historically, the governorate’s water supply was managed by the General Directorate of Water Supply 
and Sewerage of Aleppo. This governemental structure was responsible for distributing water to 
urban settlements and agricultural lands from nearby water resources. According to the MOAAR, in 
2010, around 90% of Aleppo used a drinking water source, and a total of 850,000 dwellings (94% of 
the total household) were connected to the water network.42 The governorate’s water system relied 
previously on traction projects from the Tishrin and Tabqa Dams on the Euphrates River and the April 
17 (Maydanki) Dam on the Afrin river to provide water for the city of Aleppo and for the bulk of the 
rural surroundings.43 Farmers also relied on wells to irrigate their lands. 
Since the conflict began, water has been repeatedly used as a weapon against opponents and their 
respective constituencies.44 Water has sometimes been shut off directly at source; on other occasions, 
aerial attacks and shelling targeted water infrastructure, and sometimes engineering workers were 
prevented from maintaining water services. As a result, water and sanitation infrastructure networks 
have received no consistent maintenance. Additionally, a considerable amount of damage has been 
caused to the water infrastructure by the growing displaced population in northern Aleppo. They have 
overloaded the infrastructure, and they have increased pressure on the distribution network.
Water distribution and availability vary significantly from one area to another. The Maydanki dam feeds 
Afrin, Azaz, and their surrounding agricultural lands with 15 million cubic metres annually. The Afrin 
area also benefits from the Black and Afrin rivers and a water canal that irrigates 31,000 hectares.45 
Similarly, Jarablus and its countryside also enjoy an abundance of water resources from the Euphrates 
and Sajur rivers.46 By contrast, the city of al-Bab suffers from shortages since its water source, located 
in regime-held territory, is completely cut off. The city and its adjacent areas have been forced to 
rely on wells drilled at 100-150 metres depth, putting tremendous pressure on water reserves in a 
relatively low rainfall area.47
Several Syrian and international NGOs are actively engaged in this sector to decrease groundwater 
dependency, to enhance irrigation and to reduce distribution waste.48 Most projects funded by 
international agencies and organisations are carried out in the Euphrates Shield area; there are only 
a few in Afrin. They include the restoration of water distribution systems, the supply and repair 
of pump stations, water treatment systems and canals for irrigation and drinking. Roughly 250,000 
civilians have benefited from Wash programs,49 but most NGOs’ interventions are temporary and are 
made in response to emergencies. 
42  Relief Web, “Aleppo – Governorate Profile Syria Needs Analysis Project,” March 2013, https://bit.ly/38Dam3b 
43  Fanack Project, “Water Resources in Syria,” 23 July 2019, http://bit.ly/3971S4C 
44  Erika Weinthal, Neda Zawahri, and Jeannie Sowers, “Securitizing Water, Climate, and Migration in Israel, Jordan, and 
Syria,” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 15, no. 3 (2015): 293-307.
45  Al Qala’a Magazine, “The Rehabilitation of Meydanki Dam,” (2020): 19.
46  Interview with a member of Jarablus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Jarablus, January 2021. 
47  Interview with a member of al-Bab Chamber of Commerce and Industry, al-Bab, January 2021.
48  The main actors involved are the SRTF; Syrian NGOs (Ihsan for Relief and Development, Ataa, Violet, IYD, Saed, 
Orange, Binaa, Hayat Organization, and al-Rowad Development); Syrian opposition-affiliated structures (ACU and 
Stabilisation Restoration Committee); and international organisations (CARE and the Qatari Crescent).
49  OCHA Financial Tracking Service, “Syria Humanitarian Response Plan 2015-2020,” http://bit.ly/3thqMWD; Syria 
Report, “SRTF Projects,” 30 September 2020, http://bit.ly/31dKKW8;  Ihsan for Relief and Development, “Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene,” https://www.ihsanrd.org/wash/ 
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Turkey’s investment in the water sector has been nearly non-existent. Its intervention is primarily 
manifested in humanitarian assistance provided by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency (AFAD), the Turkish Crescent, and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). The main 
reason behind the lack of Turkish interest in rehabilitating the sector are the significant costs involved: 
this includes building irrigation channels and advanced water treatment facilities. Identified by the 
UN as ‘reconstruction’ activities, other donor countries also refrain from supporting such efforts 
financially.
2.3.       Oil and Fuel: Increased Prices and Monopolies
With the lack of alternative energy sources or green initiatives, fuel is at the heart of any 
reconstruction activity in Syria. Fuel is used to feed local generators for electricity and heating, 
water pumps, agriculture, industrial, and construction machinery. Northern Aleppo does not produce 
any crude oil and depends on two sources of supply for refined oil products: the AANES and the 
international market via Turkey. The quality of the refined fuel and gasoline from oil procured from 
the AANES is more suitable for industrial and agricultural purposes. Higher quality oil products 
imported through Turkey are used in domestic and commercial contexts.
Oil acquired from AANES territory is transported from al-Jawadiya and al-Yaarubiya in tankers and 
channeled to the region across the Awn al-Dadat crossing near Manbij. It is noteworthy that a high 
percentage of the purchased oil is reserved for Kaf and Watad companies operating in Idlib.50 What 
is left of refined oil is then directly distributed through local sellers in the major cities of northern 
Aleppo, whereas any crude is transported to local primitive refineries/burners near the city of al-Bab.51 
Syrian oil is subject to taxation from the AANES and passage fees imposed by SNA factions.52 
Gasoline, diesel and butane gas acquired on the international market are initially imported through 
Mersin port via local Turkish companies and are then transported to Bab al-Salamah.53 There are also 
transit fees from the Turkish authorities and custom fees imposed by the SIG.54 
There are no official data available on the volume of oil imported from the AANES region. Large 
quantities are channeled through smuggling routes operated by SNA factions and are, thus, unaccounted 
for. As for oil imported through Turkey, an average of approximately 45,000 tonnes of diesel, 22,000 
tonnes of gasoline and 22,000 tonnes of butane gas enter through Bab al-Salamah each month, at an 
estimated cost of USD 26 million every year.55 Four local companies are operating and distributing 
oil goods in northern Aleppo.56 The prices fluctuate considerably since they are always affected by 
currency exchange fees and are not regulated by any central entity.57 The SIG has 
evaluated the possibility of unifying the procurement of oil-derivatives in northern Aleppo. 
50  Khalid al-Khatib, “SDF Oil Enters ‘Tahrir al-Sham’ Areas” (in Arabic), al Modon, 18 November 2020, 
http://bit.ly/3bM94ol 
51  Interview with the director of a local NGO, Azaz, January 2021.
52  Zeynab Masri, Ali Dervish, Nureddin Ramadan, “Two Main Sesources and Factors That Put Pressure on Prices. Who 
Controls the Fuel Sector in Northern Syria” (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, 23 August 2020, http://bit.ly/398oYHU  
53  Interview with a local distributor, Afrin, January 2021. 
54  Syrian Interim Government, “The Ministry of Finance and Economy Issues Two Decisions Regarding Customs Tariffs 
for Goods Imported and Exported Through Border Crossings” (in Arabic), 15 February 2021, http://bit.ly/3ldxb2i 
55  These quantities are estimated on the basis of 160 diesel tankers, 75 gasoline tankers, and 70 butane gas tankers per 
month. The capacity of each tanker varies from 20 to 27 tonnes.
56  These companies are Assalam, owned by a local businessman identified as Abdullah Al-Dak, Rowdha, Emdad and al-
Qalaah, whose owners could not be identified by the author. Local population believe them to be owned by businessmen 
associated with SNA factions.
57  All oil derivates are sold in TL and purchase in USD. Thus, the prices of fuel are affected by the TL-USD exchange rate.
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But it has not found the necessary financial resources for funding the operation, nor has it came up 
with a feasible plan to overcome the resistance of the SNA factions profiteering from the fuel trade. 
Consequently, unregulated oil prices are relatively higher than in north-eastern Syria.58 
Stable sources of water and electricity, coupled with access to Turkey, could boost production across 
the region. Nevertheless, opposition-held areas in northern Aleppo have faced considerable challenges 
that have prevented local communities from attaining sustainable production growth or establishing 
a viable alternative business models. Satisfaction with service provision is mixed. Whereas local 
communities are pleased with the continuity and coverage of electricity supply, they consider the 
prices of electricity to be high. Similarly, access to water is asymmetric; communities in the Bab 
district face regular shortages and cannot sustain their agricultural production. Above all, the main 
concern everywhere is the lack of legal procedures that protect consumer rights. Whether dealing 
with the Turkish electricity companies, oil distributors, or Syrian councils, the local population cannot 
make service providers accountable. Hence, investors refrain from injecting considerable sums of 
money into the region. 
Moreover, the roads are in a bad shape and impede the transportation of goods and people. A few 
roads connect the region’s main cities to complete northern Aleppo’s trade logistics and are mostly in a 
deplorable state. The M5 highway is only accessible from Bab al-Salamah to Azaz, and other roads have 
only two lanes with limited capacity. These routes are choked by SNA and Military Police checkpoints.59 
No substantial investments have been given over to rehabilitate road infrastructure, except for a new 
road connecting Bab al-Hemam to Jindires and another connecting Azaz to Bab al-Salamah and 
Suran.
58  To compare, in January 2021, a litre of gasoline in Qamishli was USD 0.23 and USD 0.64 in Azaz; a litre of diesel 
was USD 0.04 in Qamishli and USD 0.43 in Azaz; a standard butane cylinder  was USD 0.7 in Qamishli and USD 10 in 
Azaz. Qamishlu Alhan, “Increase in the Price of State Subsidised Fuel to SYP 475 and SYP 675 for Non-subsidised Fuel” 
(in Arabic), Facebook, 19 January 2021, http://bit.ly/3qMilRE; Syria TV, “Price of the Syrian Lira Compared to the 
Dollar” (in Arabic), Facebook19 january 2021, http://bit.ly/3rM8I6x; Eqtisad, “Where Can You Find the Cheapest Fuel in 
the ‘Liberated North’ Areas?” (in Arabic), 23 January 2021, http://bit.ly/3lGic1b 
59  There are roads connecting all major cities to the Turkish border and only one road that crosses the area from east to 
west. This goes from Jarablus to Afrin. 
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3. Slow Recovery in the Productive Sectors but Prosperous Trade
Northern Aleppo’s has, it is widely believed, strong potential to become a commercial and 
industrial hub for opposition-controlled territory, including Idlib and north-eastern Syria. Crippled 
from years of active fighting, local businessmen and industrials are anxious to explore new growth 
opportunities. Turkey also has a strong interest in getting the region’s production capacity back 
up and running, to encourage the return of refugees. However, security concerns, the interference 
of armed groups, and various administrative hurdles prevent local communities from testing this 
potential. In addition, trade between Turkey and Syria remains active but mostly benefits Ankara and 
its allies. These commercial exchanges have helped redraw trade networks in northern Syria with the 
emergence of influential new economic centres linked to Turkey. They however hurt local production.
3.1.       Agriculture: Little Revenue and Support
Much of Aleppo governorate lies in Syria’s most fertile belt. Historically, Aleppo’s major 
contribution to Syria’s agricultural output was wheat, olives and cotton (Map 2). In 2010, the 
governorate produced over 616,246 tonnes of wheat (20% of Syria’s wheat production).60 It was the 
second governorate in wheat production (after al-Hasakah) and the first in barley and lentils. The total 
land under cultivation in the governorate was estimated at 1,107,000 hectares (23% of the country’s 
total), primarily located in northern and western Aleppo.61 Nearly one-third of agricultural output, 
including field crops and vegetables, were produced in northern Aleppo, and over 80% of olives and 
fruit trees in Afrin. 
Map 2: Agricultural Lands in Northern Aleppo
Source: The author, February 2021
60  FAO, “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic,” 5 September 2019, 
http://bit.ly/3w0JPqD; Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Land Use by Governorate 2010” (in Arabic), 07 April 2011, 
https://bit.ly/3vRpvb0
61  The Syrian Scientific Comission for Agricultural Research, “An Overview of Agriculture in Syria and its Contribution 
to the National Economy” (in Arabic), 16 February 2015, https://bit.ly/3f7Sh1e  
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Through the war years the agricultural sector has suffered significant losses, leading to a collapse 
in sector output.62 Northern Aleppo has seen the destruction of irrigation systems, the looting and 
burning of crops, a lack of fertilisers, seeds and fuel, and a shortage of agricultural labour. These 
have all contributed to a considerable decrease in agricultural production. Nevertheless, the end of 
Turkish military operations in Afrin coincided with a net increase in rainfall in the last three years, 
considerably boosting northern Aleppo’s agricultural outcomes under better security conditions. 
According to the FAO, the whole Aleppo governorate produced 586,000 wheat tonnes in 2019, 
a 162% increase compared with 2018. Similar trends were also observed in vegetables, legumes, 
pistachio and potato production.63 This spike has enhanced food security locally, but the demand 
still exceeds supply and the region depends on food imports. The SIG, the SRTF, Syrian NGOs and 
Turkish organizations supplied wheat to sustain food security.64 The adjacent Turkish provinces also 
provided local councils with flour at a discounted price.
Olive and cotton, which are traditionally cultivated for exports, are another matter. Olive production 
is mainly centred on the Afrin region and has considerably fallen since the Turkish military 
intervention. Subject to neglect, looting, lack of security, and illegal wood harvesting, oil producers 
face increasing difficulties in making a positive return on their investments. Their ability to sell their 
produce in the national and international markets has also diminished, further damaging the sector. 
Cotton production has wholly halted since the outbreak of hostilities. Cotton producers depended on 
government incentives and a good water supply: they have now turned to other crops or abandoned 
agriculture altogether. Other difficulties for the cotton sector included the complete lack of local 
weavers, thus breaking the manufacturing cycle and any potential for a more significant profit margin. 
Similarly, cattle and poultry breeders have faced mounting challenges in sustaining their activities. 
The livestock situation has changed drastically. Important constraints include: the high prices of feed; 
limited access to animal health services; low numbers of well-trained field veterinarians and animal 
husbandry specialists; lack of hatcheries to restart poultry activities; and difficulties in accessing credit 
for production. Producers sell short (for cash) to livestock smugglers, who sell cattle at a higher price 
in Turkey and consequently benefit the most. As a result, the FAO estimates that the governorate has 
lost nearly 30% of its livestock since 2011, with a staggering 18% decrease year on year since 2018.
To respond to the challenges that the agricultural sector faces, several Syrian organizations and 
the SRTF have intervened to buttress SIG’s support for local farmers. They have provided seeds, 
agrochemicals, fertilisers and agriculture machinery. In March 2021, the SIG also successfully 
negotiated the handover of grain silos located near al-Bab, previously held by armed opposition 
groups and has since then rehabilitated them for storing purposes.65 Nevertheless, the sheer volume 
of assistance needed to restore and modernise this damaged sector exceeds their resources. Many 
farmers struggle to get sufficient water to irrigate their crops, do not obtain inputs at a competitive 
price, and they fail to sell their final product at a profit. Faced with increasing costs, they seek new 
ways to exploit their lands, such as renting them to humanitarian organizations to host IDPs’ camps 
and facilities.66 
62  Shane Middleton et al., “Resilience Through Humanitarian Assistance: Agriculture in the Syria Conflict”, Global 
Communities (May 2018): 36, https://bit.ly/2NIACSi  
63  FAO, “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic.”
64  SRTF, “Approved Projects – Food Security”, http://bit.ly/2OZXo8T; OCHA Financial Tracking Service, ‘Syrian 
Humanitarian Response 2015-2020.’
65  Syrian Public Establishment for Grain, “The General Establishment for Grain Receives a Site for the Construction 
of the Qabasin Mill Building in the Northern Countryside of Aleppo,” (in Arabic), 1 March 2021, http://bit.ly/3ctVhBR 
66  Interview with the director of a local NGO, Azaz, January 2021.
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3.2.       Industry: Hesitant Investment and Marketing Challenges
Historically, most factories were located in the city of Aleppo, but war destruction and looting 
drove manufacturers to relocate to western Syria and abroad, particularly to Turkey and Egypt. In 
comparison, the previously established factories in the countryside of northern Aleppo were small in 
volume and driven by local agricultural production. There were, for the most part, olive oil presses, 
hygienic material manufacturers, plastic utensils producers, textile workshops and shoemakers. 
The region’s industrial profile did not change dramatically after the Turkish military operations. Since 
2017, the newly established Chambers of Commerce and Industry have lobbied local councils and 
adjacent Turkish governors to take incentives to encourage capital to invest in the sector. Among the 
incentives, the import of raw material through Turkey was facilitated. Additionally, al-Bab, Azaz, al-
Rai and Jarablus cities all inaugurated industrial complexes to attract manufacturers and to boost local 
employment.67 These complexes offer the advantage of being directly connected to the electricity 
grid and roads, of being protected by local security forces and of being based on relatively low-
price land.68 Hoping to take advantage of low-cost labour, the Chambers organised visits for Turkish 
businessmen and manufacturers to convince them to move part of their production into the region.
Despite these actions, no significant investments have been injected into northern Aleppo. Except for 
the return of some local manufacturers and the establishment of new small textile and canned food 
workshops, mainly in Azaz and Jarablus, there has been no notable improvement in the industrial 
sector. The reasons for the lack of capital interest are diverse and range from financial and legal 
inconsistencies to security issues. Above all, investors have probably been put off by the lack of 
clarity over the region’s political future.
Financially, there are no banks or financial institutions that offer credits or insurance policies. With 
the exception of micro credits,69 entrepreneurs enjoy no institutional backing whatsoever, and no real 
financial incentives are provided to Syrian manufacturers to relocate their factories to the region. The 
Turkish Postal Office PTT opened 12 branches in northern Aleppo, but these are strictly reserved for 
wiring and receiving money transfers. There were rumours that the Turkish state bank, Ziraat Katilim, 
could start offering services in Azaz, but this is unlikely soon because of worries over sanctions and 
security. 
Similarly, weak legal and heterogeneous governance structures have raised many concerns among 
potential investors. The absence of a juridical authority to intervene in commercial disputes and 
the lack of protection from armed groups leave any potential businesses extremely vulnerable to 
external risks. The work force is, likewise, left defenseless and there is no labour code or specialised 
court to protect their rights and to guarantee minimum wage. Consequently, skillful workers prefer 
to emigrate to Turkey or to change professions and work in the service sector for its relatively cheap 
costs and its quicker returns on investment.
Nevertheless, the sector most significant problem is its dependency on imported raw material for 
production. This dependence has two main consequences. First, since all raw material is imported 
either from and through Turkey and is procured either in US Dollars or Turkish Lira, producers 
are compelled to sell at a higher price in the local market or to export, thus losing a competitive 
67  The industrial complexes’ legality is highly questionable, as they are built over public property and are then sold to 
individuals with no official deed recognised by the Syrian state.
68  For instance, the price of a square meter in Azaz industrial city is USD 30, nearly 20% cheaper than in the city.
69  Manaf Koman, “Syria’s Economy 2020: Which Factors are More Severe?” (in Arabic), Omran Center For Strategic 
Studies,February 2021, https://bit.ly/3vSzblw 
17
advantage both at home and abroad. Second, the failure to use locally cultivated crops and produce 
creates an artificial production surplus and is forcing farmers to export to cut their losses. In both 
cases, local communities are deprived of cheaper locally-produced goods, and their dependency on 
merchandise procured from regime-held territories and Turkey are set to increase. 
3.3.       Trade: Open Fair for Turkish Products  
Before the war, Afrin and Jarablus’s main contributions to the national economy were agriculture 
and animal husbandry. In Azaz, the main economic activity was centred around smuggling goods in 
and out of Syria. Smugglers trafficked electronics, textile, car parts, and leather procured in Turkey and 
sold state-subsided refined oil products in return. Since the disappearance of regime forces in northern 
Aleppo in 2012, the local force that managed the Bab al-Salamah crossing has been mainly composed 
of individuals from Azaz, Marea, and Tall Rifa’at. Azaz’ proximity to the border crossing and pre-war 
smuggling networks has made the city the north’s main trade hub since July 2014. Relieved of custom 
duties and state control, local businessmen imported from their Turkish neighbours, everything from 
cheap processed foods to expensive heavy machinery, cement and steel. 
Through the war years, trade between Turkey and Syria has remained active and has been the main 
source of enrichment for a small group of profiteers on the Syrian side. While Turkish exports to Syria 
continued at a relatively high volume, Syrian exports to Turkey dropped significantly following the 
Syrian uprising; from USD 336 million in 2011 to USD 90 million in 2019.70 As previously noted, 
producers have more incentives to export rather than to sell locally, firstly, for profit and, secondly, for 
hard currency. However, farmers, manufacturers and businessmen wishing to market their products 
in Turkey and abroad face obstacles including corruption and various legal challenges; for instance, a 
ban on exports of similar goods produced in Turkey. In 2019, around 75% of Syrian exports to Turkey 
were made up of olives, barley, anise, fennel, coriander, cumin, caraway seeds and dried legumes. 
Two products witnessed significant success in exports: olives increased from around USD 9 million 
in 2018 to around USD 45 million in 2019, and barley from null in 2018 to USD 10 million in 2019.71
However, the purchase of these last two products is monopolised by Turkish state agencies and 
collectives associated with the government. The TMO, Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi – the Turkish Grain 
Board, is authorised to purchase wheat from farmers directly, and the TKK, Tarım Kredi Kooperatifi 
– the Agricultural Credit Cooperative of Hatay, is the only entity allowed to procure olive oil from 
the neighbouring Afrin region. The Turkish government showcases wheat purchase as an assistance 
program to Syrian farmers. Hence, the price is relatively fair and has been fixed after negotiations 
with the SIG. On the other hand, olive oil is purchased at a much lower rate than the market price and 
then resold on the international market for a significant profit.72 Despite its world-renowned prime 
quality, Afrin olive oil has lost market value because, in large part, of corrupt armed groups who force 
themselves on farmers as mediators with the TTK and who drive the prices down to sell more.
70  Turkey Statistical Institute, “Foreign Trade Index December 2020” (in Turkish), 10 February 2021, 
https://bit.ly/3aNWxjM
71  Ministry of Commerce, Foreign Representations and International Events, “Syria Country Profile” (in Turkish), 3 June 
2020, https://bit.ly/2ZCD3IF 
72  Reports estimate that nearly 90 thousand tonnes of Afrin olive oil were purchased by the TKK since 2018. 
Cumhuriyet, “Not Turkish Olive Oil, Oil Brought from Afrin is Exported to the USA” (in Turkish), 19 November 2020, 
http://bit.ly/397Q5mw 
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The other international destinations for Syrian exporters are Iraq, Libya, and the Arab Gulf countries,73 
but producers face a significant legal complication that prevents them from easily conducting business. 
To export, producers need to present a legal certificate of origin that confirms the source of their 
produce, and since the regime does not deliver any certificate outside its territory, Syrian exporters 
outside regime-held territory have a serious problem. To overcome this difficulty, Turkey has agreed 
to allow the transit of Syrian goods across its territory to other destinations as long as the importing 
country provides official authorisation. This solution means further complications and bureaucracy 
and has established a sideline business for well-connected and influential customs brokers who work 
with Syrian armed groups. 
Ultimately, trading with Turkey and through it has become an elitist affair, something only possible 
to a few wealthy businessmen and powerful profiteers. The Azaz local council has, as the result of an 
unempowered SIG, imposed an annual fee for obtaining authorisations to import or export from Bab 
al-Salamah. The authorisation costs USD 2,000, and it grants a visa waiver to Turkey. Two thousand 
dollars would, for many local producers, cover the expenses of an entire family for six months or 
more. 
Another viable option is trading with AANES and regime-held territories, but producers are generally 
reluctant to go down this route for two reasons. First, both AANES and regime-associated businessmen 
require purchases in Syrian pounds while they sell their products in US Dollars. This arrangement 
depletes the hard currency reserves of local businessmen and exposes them to the continuous 
depreciation of the Syrian Pound. The second reason is the systematic use of smuggling routes. Since 
the SIG decision to ban all trade with the regime territory, the only way to transport goods to Aleppo 
or Hama is by paying an average of USD 2,000 fees to influential warlords to pass a single shipment. 
A consequent amount that is only justified when selling goods with a relatively large profit margin. 
The legal and financial challenges are far more discouraging than encouraging to conduct business 
with real surplus value in production. Consequently, the dependency of local communities on 
humanitarian assistance has increased, and the few who can afford it prefer to invest in the service 
sector, such as hospitality or retail.
73  Iraq imports legume, textiles, canned food, hygiene products and plastics. Libya and the GCC import limestone, 
sphalte and other minerals for construction.
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Conclusion
Syrian opposition figures and many scholars have presented decentralisation as a viable model for 
governing Syria and as an inclusive framework that preserves communities’ autonomy and increases 
their political engagement on a nation-wide scale. The call for decentralisation is also a response 
to fragmented political and security realities. It is a way to accommodate the different influential 
actors and to freeze the conflict. This pragmatic approach to embracing the unavoidable devolution of 
authority has many merits but could cause more damage than good if executed poorly. As this paper 
demonstrated, the lack of attention to the economic vulnerability that all Syrian communities are 
currently suffering from could impede their recovery potential despite the best intentions. 
The SIG’s inability to enforce its authority has produced various deficiencies in the legal, gouverance 
and financial systems of northern Syria. Local councils act independently and implement contradictory 
policies, and armed opposition groups interfere with impunity. Consequently, communities have fallen 
into despair, and grass-roots initiatives to revive the local economy face insurmountable challenges. 
Additionally, dealing and negotiating with Turkey, a regional economic powerhouse, has become a 
profiteers paradise with little by way of trickle-down effect for the larger population. 
Turkey has an inherent interest in stabilising the region it directly controls in northern Aleppo. 
Rehabilitating the local economy could encourage the return of Syrian refugees and lessen pressure 
on Turkey’s southern borders. Nevertheless, Turkey’s engagement in protecting and facilitating such 
efforts has fallen short thus far. Except for minor investments in restoring parts of the electricity 
grid and some roads, Turkey’s contribution has been, for the most part, transactional and limited 
to delivering humanitarian assistance or conducting business deals with the private sector. Ankara 
appointed advisors to local councils, and the governors of adjacent provinces are passively engaged in 
northern Aleppo reconstruction. Their performance has been mostly restricted to keeping their Syrian 
counterparts in check rather than to actively seeking sustainable solutions for current difficulties. 
Consumed by security concerns, Ankara has not developed a proper strategy for northern Syria’s 
economic recovery. But, even if it dedicated time and energy to this problem, Turkey alone would not 
be enough. Local Syrian communities would require tremendous levels of international engagement 
to free their potential. The international community should, were aid to be forthcoming, not restrict 
itself to finance, but should offer institutional support for the reform of local government and economic 
structures. Left alone, Syrian communities will remain vulnerable to clientelism, corruption, and 
extremism. 
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